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Maria Crimi Speth, #012574 
David S. Gingras, #021097                       
JABURG & WILK, P.C. 
3200 North Central Avenue, Suite 2000 
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 
(602) 248-1000 
 
Attorneys for Defendants Edward  
Magedson and Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C. 
 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
GLOBAL ROYALTIES, LTD., a Canadian 
corporation; BRANDON HALL, a 
Canadian citizen, 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
XCENTRIC VENTURES, L.L.C. et al.,  
 
 Defendants.  
 
 
Case No.:  CV 07-956 PHX-FJM 
 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
 
(Assigned to Hon. Frederick J. Martone) 
Defendants EDWARD MAGEDSON (“Magedson”) and XCENTRIC 
VENTURES, L.L.C. (“Xcentric”; collectively “Defendants”) respectfully request that this 
Court dismiss the above-captioned action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  
As explained below, nothing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint resolves any of the 
defects which previously caused this Court to dismiss this matter (with leave to amend).  
As such, the Court should again dismiss this case under Rule 12(b)(6). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Court is aware, this case began on May 10, 2007 with a Complaint which 
contained two independent theories: 1.) That Plaintiff was entitled to enforce a Canadian 
“judgment” (actually more akin to a preliminary injunction); and 2.) the same facts 
supported an independent claim against Defendants for defamation. 
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On August 3, 2007 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #13) which argued 
that both of Plaintiffs’ theories failed to present claims upon which relief could be 
granted.  On October 10, 2007, this Court entered an Order (Doc. #20) granting 
Defendants’ motion and ordered the case dismissed, with leave to amend. 
On November 1, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. #22) as 
permitted by the Court’s prior ruling.   In the new Complaint, Plaintiffs have entirely 
abandoned any/all mention of the pending Canadian litigation and it appears that Plaintiffs 
no longer seek any relief in this Court based on any injunctions/orders entered in the 
Canadian action.  As such, this Motion does not address the Canadian issue. 
This leaves only Plaintiffs’ single standalone claim for relief—defamation.  
However, despite some minor “tweaking” of facts, nothing in the Amended Complaint has 
changed and certainly no new facts have been alleged which are sufficient to produce a 
different result than the one this Court has already reached—Plaintiffs’ defamation claim 
is prohibited by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
II. ARGUMENTS RE: MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS’ DEFAMATION CLAIM 
A. The “First Statement” Is STILL Barred By The Statute of Limitations 
As noted in Defendants’ original Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs’ original Complaint 
described three separate statements which form Plaintiffs’ defamation claim.  The same 
three statements have been re-alleged again in the Amended Complaint. 
The first statement, set forth in ¶ 15 of the Amended Complaint, was allegedly 
published on March 27, 2006.  This action was commenced more than one year later on 
May 10, 2007.   
As Defendants explained in their original motion, even if true, this allegation fails 
to state a claim because it is barred by the 1-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-541.  
See Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (App. 1986) (1-year limit on actions for 
libel/slander).   As explained before, this 1-year period begins to run on the date of 
publication, not the date the plaintiff discovers the publication. See Lim v. Superior Court, 
126 Ariz. 481, 482 (App. 1980). 
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In an apparent effort to save this part of their claim, the Amended Complaint 
contains a “new” allegation in ¶ 17 which conveniently alleges, “Plaintiffs discovered the 
first statement on May 15, 2006, when a Global Royalties customer brought the posting to 
[Plaintiffs’] attention.” (emphasis added).   Obviously, the implication is that because 
Plaintiffs only “discovered” the First Statement on May 15, 2006, this action was timely 
when filed on May 10, 2007 because the statute of limitations was tolled under a 
“discovery rule” theory. 
This argument is directly contrary to well-settled Arizona law; “Many cases that 
have considered whether failure to discover the defamation affects the running of the 
statute of limitations have held it does not.”  Clark v. Airesearch Manu. Co. of Ariz., 138 
Ariz. 240, 241–42, 673 P.2d 984, 985–86 (App. 1983) (citing Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 
438 F.2d 1043 (5th  Cir. 1971);  Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 
323 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1963);  White v. Fawcett Publications, 324 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.Mo. 
1970);  Patterson v. Renstrom, 188 Neb. 78, 195 N.W.2d 193 (1972).  On the contrary, 
Arizona applies the discovery rule only in a very limited context wherein, “the alleged 
defamatory statements are published under circumstances in which they are likely to be 
kept secret from the injured party for a considerable time.” Clark, 138 Ariz. at 242, 673 
P.2d 984, 986 (emphasis added). 
Here, not only does the Amended Complaint fail to allege that Defendants 
published any statements in a “secret” manner, ¶ 12 of the Amended Complaint alleges 
exactly the opposite: 
 
¶ 12.  Visitors’ complaints posted on the Ripoffreport.com Website are 
discovered by millions of consumers.  Search engines, such as Google, 
automatically discover these complaints, meaning that within just a few 
days or weeks, complaints may be found on search engines when 
consumers search using key words relating to a business or individual.  
(emphasis added) 
 
Clearly, assuming these allegations are true, there is no basis to apply the discovery 
rule to the First Statement, and that statement is time-barred under A.R.S. § 12-541.   
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In addition to the statute of limitations problem, the First Statement is still subject 
to dismissal based on the Communications Decency Act arguments which were 
previously explained at length in Defendants’ original Motion to Dismiss.  In granting that 
motion, this Court correctly observed that the CDA barred Plaintiffs’ claims because, 
“[t]he most plaintiff alleges is that defendant supplied a list of titles from which Sullivan 
[the author] picked the phrase “Con Artists” to label the first statement.  This minor and 
passive participation in the development of content will not defeat CDA immunity, which 
can even withstand more active participation.” MTD Ruling (Doc. #20) at 5:20–22 (citing 
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
Despite this, in ¶¶ 18–21 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs continues to allege 
that Defendants are “solely responsible for the creation and development of the category 
entitled ‘Con Artists’” and therefore, by extension, Defendants are liable for Mr. 
Sullivan’s decision to place his report into that category.  Of course, this Court has already 
ruled this theory incompatible with the CDA, and that logic is soundly supported by the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in not only Batzel, but also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. in 
which the Court rejected an argument similar to the one presented by Plaintiffs here: 
 
Carafano responds that Matchmaker contributes much more structure and 
content than eBay by asking 62 detailed questions and providing a menu of 
"pre-prepared responses."  However, this is a distinction of degree rather 
than of kind, and Matchmaker still lacks responsibility for the "underlying 
misinformation."    
Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that CDA applied to website even 
though site required users to select answers from a list of pre-written choices).  Just as in 
Carafano, it makes no difference that Defendants have created a variety of category 
choices for users to pick from (most of which are entirely benign, though “Con Artists” is 
among the list), nor is CDA immunity lost because users of Ripoff Report website create 
their reports, in part, by responding to questions drafted by Defendants; “The fact that 
some of the content was formulated in response to Matchmaker's questionnaire does not 
alter this conclusion.  … Matchmaker cannot be considered an ‘information content 
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provider’ under the statute because no profile has any content until a user actively creates 
it.”  Id. at 1124 (emphasis added). 
 This logic controls here.  The Amended Complaint admits that all allegedly 
defamatory content was created by a third party user of the Ripoff Report website – 
Spencer Sullivan.  Because Mr. Sullivan’s report(s) (whether one or three or more) 
contained no content until Mr. Sullivan created them, the CDA applies in full to any and 
all claims based on that content and although Mr. Sullivan might be, Defendants simply 
are not responsible for the accuracy of this third-party content. 
 Again, because the Amended Complaint contains no substantially new factual 
allegations, this Court’s prior finding that the CDA applies should stand.   This does not 
mean that Plaintiffs are left without any remedy.  As other courts have noted, “Plaintiffs 
are free under section 230 [of the CDA] to pursue the originator of a defamatory Internet 
publication.  Any further expansion of liability must await Congressional action.”  Barrett 
v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 77–78, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully request an order dismissing 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that the 
pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED this12th day of November 2007.  
 
 
 JABURG & WILK, P.C. 
 
 /s/ David S. Gingras    
 Maria Crimi Speth 
 David S. Gingras 
 Attorneys for Defendant Xcentric  
 Ventures, L.L.C. and Ed Magedson 
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Certificate of Service 
 
 I hereby certify that on August 12, 2007, I electronically transmitted the attached 
document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing, and for transmittal of 
a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: 
 
Donald Joseph Karl 
Andre H. Merrett 
Deana S. Peck 
Quarles & Brady, LLP 
One Renaissance Square 
Two North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona  85004 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 And a copy of the foregoing mailed on August 13, 2007, to: 
 
Honorable Frederick J. Martone 
United States District Court 
District of Arizona 
 
 
 
      s/David S. Gingras     
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